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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
ESTATE TAX
In the year 1926, Congress passed an estate tax that allows a
credit for all estate, inheritance, succession, and legacy taxes paid
to the various states, provided the total credit shall not be more than
80 per cent of the tax due the United States.' Following this act,
the North Carolina Legislature in 1927, passed an estate tax law,2
in addition to the inheritance tax that had previously been imposed.
By the provisions of this act, a tax equal to the full percentage of
the Federal tax, levied upon the same estate, allowed as a credit by
the United States for payment of said tax to the state of North
Carolina, is imposed.
In the recent case of Haygood v. Doughtons the interpretation
of the Commissioner of Revenue, and the constitutionality of this
law is challenged. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner
was correct in his interpretation and that the law was constitutional.
The case can be better understood by a brief history of the estate
tax laws of the Federal government and of North Carolina. In the
Federal Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 no credit was allowed on
the estate tax due the United States for amounts paid to the states
in the form of inheritance, estate, succession, or legacy taxes. The
Federal law of 1924 allowed a credit up to 25 per cent for amounts
paid to the various states, and the 1926 law, that is now under con-
sideration, allows a credit of 80 per cent. In the North Carolina
Revenue Acts that were passed in 1921, 1923, and 1925, inheritance
taxes were imposed, but no estate tax was imposed in addition
thereto. It was only after the Federal government allowed a credit
of 80 per cent that the State of North Carolina imposed its estate tax.
The estate tax imposed by North Carolina did not materially
increase the tax burden on the transfer of estates over what was
imposed before 1926. Had the tax not been imposed, the burden
would have been considerably decreased because the Federal gov-
ernment increased the credit allowed for amounts paid to the various
126 U. S. C. A., §1093; U. S. Comp. Stat., §6336 5/8 a.
N. C. Pub. Laws, 1927, ch. 80, §6.
' Haygood v. Doughton, 195 N. C. 811, 143 S. E. 841 (1928).
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states from 25 to 80 per cent.4 In determining the wisdom of a tax
that is imposed, the taxes imposed by Federal government, counties,
towns, and all special taxing districts must be considered. If there
'was a just proportion of the burden of taxation before 1926, there
is no undue burden under the present law in North Carolina.
There has been much propaganda published to influence Congress
to relinquish estate and inheritance taxes to the various states. The
views of the members of Congress differ very considerably. Some
members wished to have a high Federal estate tax and to lower other
taxes. Others were in favor of repealing the Federal estate tax
outright. Still others were afraid certain states would abuse the
repeal of the Federal law, impose no inheritance tax and thus become
rest havens for retired business men to the detriment of other states
desiring to impose such a tax.5 The 1926 estate tax, allowing the
80 per cent credit for amounts paid to the various states, was im-
posed, because the majority of Congress thought that the inheritance
tax was sound in principle. It was recognized that, if the states
would pass inheritance tax laws, the burden on other taxing sources
'For illustration assume an estate for $500,000 with only one heir and that
being a widow. Year 1927 (if
N. C. estate tax
had not been
Year 1925 Year 1927 passed)
North Carolina
Total amount of estate ......... $500,000
Exemption for widow .......... 10,000
$490,000
Inheritance Tax ................ $ 15,850
N. C. estate tax based on
Federal credit ...............
Total N. C. tax ................ $ 15,850
United States
Total amount of estate ......... $500,000
Exemption ..................... 100,000
$400,000
Estate Tax ..................... $ 10,000
Credit allowed for amounts paid
to North Carolina ........... 2,500
Net tax to U. S ................ $ 7,500
Total tax to N. C. and to U. S .... $ 23,350
See debate in Congress. Congressional Record,














$ 10,000 $ 10,000
8,000 8,000
$ 2,000 $ 2,000
$ 25,850 $ 17,850
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could be lessened. The Federal government did not need the revenue,
and Congress, thinking that such a tax was equitable and should be
imposed, encouraged the states to acquire revenue from this source,
by allowing the estate a credit up to 80 per cent on amounts due
the United States, for the tax paid to the various states. It is fairly
clear that Congress did not entirely abolish the estates tax, because it
recognized that certain states would impose no inheritance tax in
order to induce men of wealth to establish their residences in those
states.6 One or two states could in this way acquire a large eco-
nomic advantage over the others. Such a policy would tend to
cause other states to repeal their inheritance tax laws in order to
prevent their wealth from being depleted by the emigration of their
richest citizens. It is possible that all the states would abandon
such taxes were it not for the Federal Act.
The 80 per cent credit clause of the Federal Act was recently
held to be constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States.7
Assuming, as was claimed, that the Act does indirectly coerce Florida
into imposing an inheritance tax, that fact is not any more unjust
than to allow Florida to coerce all the other states into abandoning
their inheritance taxes.
The most important arguments advanced against the North Caro-
lina Act in the instant case were:
1. Since the inheritance tax paid to the State of North Carolina
was more than the credit allowed by the Federal Act, there is no
credit left for the North Carolina estate tax, and, therefore, no
estate tax is due. Although the wording of the statute is not abso-
lutely free from ambiguity, the argument advanced is untenable, for
it is clear that the intention was to impose the estate tax in addition.
The courts interpret such statute in the light of the intention of the
legislature,8 if possible. The North Carolina Supreme Court held
that the full credit allowed by the Federal government to the estate
should be construed as being on account of the North Carolina estate
tax and that the inheritance tax was in addition to this amount.
'See Note 4, supra.
"Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 47 S. Ct. 265 (1927). The Court said:
"All that the constitution requires is that the laws shall be uniform in the
sense that by its provisions the rule of liability shall be alike in all parts of
the United States."
8 Fortune v. Commissioners, 140 N. C. 322, 52 S. E. 950 (1905) ; State v.
Johnson, 170 N. C. 685, 86 S. E. 788 (1915); State v. Bell, 184 N. C. 701,
115 S. E. 190 (1922); People v. Mensching, 187 N. Y. 8, 79 N. E. 884 (1907);
Hill v. Micham, 116 Ohio St. 549, 157 N. E. 13 (1927) ; Hunter v. Harrison,
154 Tenn. 590, 288 S. W. 355 (1926).
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2. The tax imposed is an interference with and a burden upon
the exercise of the taxing power and the policies of the United
States, contrary to Article 1, Section 5, of the Constitution of North
Carolina. How could this tax impose a burden on the exercise of
the taxing power and policies of the United States, when it is in line
with that which Congress desired ?9
3. By making the tax equal to the full amount of the credit
allowed in the Federal law the legislature has delegated to the Fed-
eral Congress the determination of the rate of the tax. It is argued
that this is arbitrary and in violation of the 14th amendment of the
Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 17, of the
Constitution of North Carolina in that it amounts to taking property
without due process of law. There is some merit in the criticism of
the law on the ground that it is a delegation of legislative power.
The contention is that the validity of the tax depends upon the legis-
lation of Congress and that it is, therefore, not in itself a complete
expression of the North Carolina legislative will. This question is
somewhat analogous to mutual or retaliatory measures passed by
various states; e.g., a state often passes a law exempting foreign
corporations from certain requirements, provided the parent state of
the corporation grants similar privileges to corporations of the first
state. Such laws have been held constitutional in all states where
the question has arisen, except one.' 0
It may be argued that an estate tax in addition to an inheritance
tax is double taxation of the same property by the same taxing
power. Double taxation may be undesirable, but there is no con-
stitutional provision against it unless such taxation should be con-
fiscatory, thereby being a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The North Carolina inheritance and estate taxes are in no sense con-
fiscatory, nor are they taxes on property. An inheritance tax and
an estate tax are both excise taxes.1 The former is a tax on the
See Note 4, s'upra."0 See list of cases, 14A-C. J. 1268, note 61. In the case of Home Ins. Co.
v. Swigert, 104 Ill. 653 (1882), the court said: "Where the contingency upon
which the ultimate operation of the law is made to depend, consists of the
action of some foreign legislative body, it is erroneous to suppose the legis-
lature in such cases abandons its own legislative function or delegates its pow-
ers to such foreign legislative body."
'Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 S. Ct. 747 (1900); U. S. v. Perkins,
163 U. S. 625, 16 S. Ct. 1073 (1895) ; In re Estate of E. I, Davis and in re
Estate of Burnwell, 190 N. C. 358, 130 S. E. 22 (1926), uniformity rule inappli-
cable to inheritance taxes; First National Bank of Boston v. Com. of Corp.
& Taxation, 258 Mass. 253, 154 N. E. 844 (1927); In re Opinion of Justices,
137 A. 50 (Me., 1927).
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right to receive property by descent or bequest, and the latter is a
tax on the right to transmit property by descent or bequest. In a
recent Oregon case,12 a statute providing for an estate tax and an
inheritance tax on the same devolution of property was held to be
constitutional.
Some kind of inheritance or succession tax was imposed in all
the states, except three, as of October 7, 1927.13 Twelve states had
amended their inheritance tax measures to take advantage of the
credit provision of the Federal tax measure at that time. The con-
stitutionality of the estate tax based on the Federal credit was re-
cently approved by the Supreme Court of Maine.14 In Maine and
most of the states, the amendment to the inheritance tax measure
was made in order that any difference between the credit allowed
under the Federal measure and the existing state inheritance tax
measures could be taken advantage of by the state. North Carolina
seems to be out of line in imposing the estate tax for the full meas-
ure of the Federal credit, in addition to the inheritance tax imposed.
The wisdom of this act may be questioned, whether one favors large
succession taxes or not, for the North Carolina measure, being in
addition to the inheritance tax, makes the tax paid by its decedents
larger than that paid by decedents in other states. Instead of encour-
aging rich people to come to its resorts to retire, North Carolina
encourages them to move to other states.
C. B. SPARGER.
Instructor in Accounting,
University of North Carolina.
REGISTRATION OF FEDERAL JUDGMENTS
The duty of the abstracter in reference to Federal judgments is
involved in confusion. For many years it has been the practice of
abstracting attorneys to make no examination of the judgment dock-
ets of the Federal Court and to rely upon Consolidated Statutes 616
which provides for the docketing of Federal judgments in the State
court. This practice is still almost universal but its propriety is a
matter of great doubt. The question has been brought to the atten-
tion of the profession by the case of Rhea v. Smith.' in which the
'In re Heck's Estate, 120 Ore. 80, 250 Pac. 733 (1926).
"American Taxpayers! -League, Bulletin No. 71.
In re Opinion of Justices, supra note 11.'Rhea v. Smith, 274 U. S. 434, 47 S. Ct. 698 (1927).
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United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft,
held that the Missouri Conformity Act was not in accordance with
the Act of Congress and that judgments of a Federal court in Mis-
souri were liens upon land without being docketed in the state court.
This case should receive the careful attention of abstracters.
The North Carolina Conformity Act has not been passed upon by
the United States Supreme Court. The particular defect pointed out
in the Rhea case is not applicable to the North Carolina statute but it
is possible that a similar difficulty exists. The reasoning of the Rhea
case is that if a state judgment has any advantage over a Federal
judgment then the terms of the Act of Congress have not been met
by the state statute and therefore Federal judgments do not have to
be recorded in the state court. The question that arises is whether
C. S. 613 gives a state judgment an advantage over a Federal judg-
ment which would prevent the operation of the Federal Conformity
Act. Under C. S. 613 a judgment of the Superior Court docketed
during the term at which rendered or within ten days thereafter
relates back to the first day of the term. Our State Supreme Court
has said that the purpose of this relation back is to avoid an indecent
haste in getting the ear of the court and has held that there is no
relation back as against an intervening mortgage. 2 Under the theory
behind these cases it is a natural conclusion that our court would
hold that the relation back statute does not apply so as to give a
state judgment priority over a Federal judgment docketed after the
first day of a state court term and prior to the actual docketing of
the state judgment. That conclusion has been reached by the New
York Title & Mortgage Co. and they have instructed counsel upon
their approved list that the examination of Federal court dockets is
unnecessary. Other companies, however, take the view that until
there is an explicit decision on the question the Federal judgment
dockets must be examined. A decision of our Supreme Court carry-
ing the doctrine of the above cases to its logical conclusion and hold-
ing that the relation back statute is limited to judgments inter se of
the same parentage is much to be desired and in the absence of such
holding it would appear advisable for the Legislature to amend the
relation back statute so as to eliminate all doubt. Until the matter
has been removed from the realm of uncertainty by one or the other
' See Riley v. Carter, 165 N. C. 334, 81 S. E. 414 (1914); McKinne v.
Street, 165 N. C. 515, 81 S. E. 757 (1914) ; Fovle v. McLean, 168 N. C. 537, 84
S. E. 852 (1915).
